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ABSTRACT
Many researchers work on improving the data efficiency of machine
learning. What would happen if they succeed? This paper explores
the social-economic impact of increased data efficiency. Specifically,
we examine the intuition that data efficiency will erode the barriers
to entry protecting incumbent data-rich AI firms, exposing them to
more competition from data-poor firms. We find that this intuition
is only partially correct: data efficiency makes it easier to create
ML applications, but large AI firms may have more to gain from
higher performing AI systems. Further, we find that the effect on
privacy, data markets, robustness, and misuse are complex. For
example, while it seems intuitive that misuse risk would increase
along with data efficiency – as more actors gain access to any
level of capability – the net effect crucially depends on how much
defensive measures are improved. More investigation into data
efficiency, as well as research into the “AI production function", will
be key to understanding the development of the AI industry and
its societal impacts.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Social and professional topics→ Economic impact; Surveil-
lance; •Computingmethodologies→Machine learning; Trans-
fer learning; • Theory of computation → Active learning; • Se-
curity and privacy→ Economics of security and privacy.
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Figure 1: The Access Effect
1 INTRODUCTION
How does the performance of an artificial intelligence (AI) system
scale with more data, more computational resources, and better
algorithms? In other words, what is the AI production function1?
This question influences the shape of AI progress, the structure of
the AI industry, and the societal impacts of AI.
In this paper, we offer a preliminary analysis of one aspect of the
AI production function - data. Specifically, we analyze the implica-
tions of increases in data efficiency2: increases in the performance a
system achieves for any given data input. We find that increases in
data efficiency have an access effect – where more actors get access
to ML capabilities – and a performance effect – where performance
for any given dataset is improved.
Predictions about the AI industry and its societal impacts often
implicitly rely on claims regarding the AI production function and
specifically on the relationship between data and the performance
of systems. Kai-Fu Lee, for example, claims that China has an ad-
vantage with regards to developing AI technology, partly because
we live in an “Age of Data", where “once computing power and
engineering talent reach a certain threshold, the quantity of data
becomes decisive in determining the ... accuracy of an algorithm"
[21]. Views on the AI production function âĂŞ in particular current
1Wedepart slightly from the standard definition of production functions [7] by focusing
on the relationship between the inputs to a machine learning (ML) system and the
performance of the system, rather than between the inputs and outputs of using the
ML system on a specific task.
2Computer scientists may recognize this as being related to sample complexity. We
prefer the term data efficiency because it is more intuitive to map "more efficient" to
"higher performance", than "lower complexity" to "higher performance". Further, we
do not mean to imply any statistical properties of our data (in contrast to the word
"sample").
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Figure 2: The Performance Effect
methods’ data efficiency âĂŞ often also inform views about the
limits of machine learning, with many leading researchers for ex-
ample Yann LeCun, Geoffrey Hinton, Yoshua Bengio (interviewed
in [11]), and Gary Marcus [24], commenting that the need for large
amounts of data suggest limitations of our current techniques.
Data efficiency is likely to increase. Many recent advances in
Machine Learning and Artificial Intelligence have come from deep
learning, a technique which enables high performance on challeng-
ing tasks such as image recognition at the cost of large compute
requirements as well as needing large data sets. At the same time,
we know that improvements to data efficiency are possible. For
instance, humans can learn simple visual concepts such as novel
characters from single instances [19]. In addition, researchers are
interested in making more efficient machine learning algorithms,
which decrease the amount of data or compute necessary to achieve
some level of performance. For example, transfer learning seeks
to use pretraining on one dataset to improve performance on an-
other problem or dataset [26]3. Few and zero-shot learning seek
to successfully learn classifications from very few examples [33].
Active learning seeks to increase the value of each data point by
getting more informative data points [8]. Data efficiency can also
be improved by improving data quality, for instance by developing
better sensors.
This paper summarises the empirical literature on how perfor-
mance scales with data, and introduces a simple model to analyze
the implications of improved data efficiency. We then explore im-
plications for the AI industry and society, followed by suggestions
for directions for future work.
2 PRIORWORK ON THE DATA EFFICIENCY
AND PRODUCTION FUNCTION OF AI
2.0.1 Compute costs over time. Recent authors have estimated that
the amount of compute used in the largest AI training runs is
increasing exponentially, doubling every 3.5 months [2]. Some au-
thors suggest this is reason for skepticism about future AI progress,
since requiring exponentially more resources to achieve results
will become prohibitively expensive [5, 12]. These high compute
requirements, at least in reinforcement learning applications where
3We include transfer learning as a method for data efficiency because it improves the
data efficiency of the target task.
the compute is being used to produce training data, suggest there
would be large gains from improvements in data efficiency.
2.0.2 The relationship between performance and data. Recent em-
pirical work suggests that there may be a simple relationship be-
tween data, model size, and performance.
One investigation found that across different settings, a power
law model (where performance is proportional to the amount of
data to some power) described the relationship between the amount
of data and performance, as long as the model size grew at a rate
dictated by a separate power law [18]. If true, these power law rela-
tionships allow one to model the data and hardware requirements
for a specific performance level, as attempted in recent work [17].
Work by other groups have also found that performance in-
creases with more data, as long as model size is also allowed to
increase. While many authors agree on the power law model (for in-
stance [29], [9], [6], and [18]), other authors find that a logarithmic
model explains the relationship [34]. Not all work agrees that there
is a simple relationship – one experiment which did not increase
model size found that performance was only marginally improved
by increasing the dataset size [23].
Note that the overall shape of our data to performance schematics
agree with the empirical results of a recent paper investigating data
efficient supervised learning [16].
2.0.3 ML performance over time. While there has been excellent
work in tracking changes toML performance over time (for example
[32] and [10]), to our knowledge there are no similar compilations
in tracking how data efficiency has changed over time. We believe
that this would be a promising direction for future research.
3 MODELING DATA EFFICIENCY:
ASSUMPTIONS
What are the effects of increasing data efficiency? We construct a
simple model of what it means for data efficiency to increase. We
model data efficiency as a certain data to performance function,
making two assumptions.
Let the data to performance curve for an ML system be a function
f , which takes in a quantity of data d , and returns the performance
p of the system given that amount of training data. Assume that f
is defined in a manner where a larger p is higher performance.
For clarity of presentation, our assumptions tend to be stronger
than are necessary for our argument.
3.0.1 Assumption 1:Monotonic performance increases. Addingmore
data will not decrease system performance according to its perfor-
mance function âĂŞ performance will remain increase. We omit
considerations of computational cost from our analysis. Formally:
∀d,d ′ : d ′ > d =⇒ f (d ′) > f (d)
“More data always improves performance"
3.0.2 Assumption 2: Eventually diminishing marginal returns. Even-
tually the system will reach a point (here denoted asm) where it
sees diminishing marginal returns to performance from data. Intu-
itively, the first time you see something is more informative than
the millionth time. This claim has been theoretically shown for
some performance functions [1].
∃m such that ∀d > m,d ′ > m,∆ > 0 the following holds
d ′ > d =⇒ f (d ′ + ∆) − f (d ′) < f (d + ∆) − f (d)
“At some point, more data does not help as much as before"
4 MODELS OF DATA EFFICIENCY
How can we model increased data efficiency as a transformation
of a data to performance function: f to a new fefficient? We discuss
three models of data efficiency to demonstrate different intuitions.
4.0.1 Data efficiency modeled as adding data. Data efficiency can
be simply modeled as analogous to giving all users more data.
This model may be appropriate for understanding the impact of
transfer learning, where you use data from one source to improve
performance on a variety of tasks. Similarly, this model may be
appropriate when data efficiency with respect to real world data
comes from using additional simulated data. We do not claim that
each data point of simulated or transfer data is as useful as a data
point for the target task, but rather that they may be equivalent to
some amount of data for the target task.
fefficient(d) = f (d + c) where c > 0
“Data efficiency is like adding more data"
4.0.2 Data efficiency by increasing data value. Another way to
model data efficiency is as an increase in the value of data. This
could be accomplished through "better data", for instance by col-
lecting data from better placed sensors, which better capture the
phenomena one is trying to model. Another plausible path to in-
creased data value is by using active learning, where each data
point is chosen to be more informative to the system.
fefficient(d) = f (a ∗ d) where a > 1
“Data efficiency is like accessing a constant factor more data"
4.0.3 Data efficiency modeled by function composition. A general
formal expression of data efficiency is as follows, where д is mono-
tonic and continuous:
fefficient(d) = f (д(d)) where д(d) > d
4.1 Two core effects of Data Efficiency
We conceptualize the impacts of data efficiency as composed of two
effects – an access effect and a performance effect. The access effect
refers to how any given ML capability becomes more accessible
to more actors: a given level of performance becomes accessible
with less data. The performance effect refers to how for any given
amount of data, it becomes possible to achieve higher performance.
4.1.1 The Access Effect. As depicted in Figure 1, the access effect
refers to the leftward shift of the data to performance curve. This
captures most of the straightforward impacts of improved data effi-
ciency, namely decreased data requirements to achieve any given
level of performance. This has the effect of enabling new applica-
tions in data limited domains and broadening access of existing
capabilities to more actors.
Claim 1. Improved data efficiency makes any given level of per-
formance attainable with less data
Formally, all of our models of data efficiency transform d in some
way such that д(d) > d for every d . Assuming continuity, this
means that there is some d ′ < d such that д(d ′) ≥ d , and therefore
fefficient = f (д(d ′)) ≥ f (d) attaining or exceeding the same level of
performance with less data.
4.1.2 The Performance Effect. As depicted in Figure 2, the perfor-
mance effect refers to the upward shift in performance for a given
amount of data. It can be muted by the presence of performance
ceilings or diminishing marginal returns. This increases the level of
performance for many levels of data, assuming access to the same
algorithms.
Claim 2. Improved data efficiency increases performance
Formally, all of our models of data efficiency transform d in some
way such thatд(d) > d for everyd . By themonotonicity assumption,
this fact implies that fefficient(d) = f (д(d)) > f (d).
5 CONSEQUENCES OF INCREASED DATA
EFFICIENCY
5.1 Impact on ML-based Capabilities and
Applications
5.1.1 New applications in data limited domains. One of the clearest
implications of data efficiency is the ability to use ML to solve
problems in data-limited domains. Data may be limited because
there are fundamental limitations – e.g. the data does not exist – or
because collecting it is expensive.
One notable example of an area where there is a limited amount
of obtainable data is ancient languages, where only so many known
text fragments exist. Improvements in data efficiency may improve
machine translation applications in these domains.
There are many domains where obtaining new data is costly.
This can be data from expensive medical or chemical tests, sensors,
real world experiments, or human feedback. As data efficiency
improves one would expect ML applications in these domains to
become more feasible. This is also the case in domains where data is
not presently being collected but potentially could be (for instance,
expert judgment for a specific area in a standardized format on
difficult questions e.g. medical diagnosis).
A particularly important example for this trend is robotics. Col-
lecting data from real world robots may be expensive because of
the costs of robot time (maintenance, damage risk, needing to reset
the task, etc.). Relatively recent improvements to data efficiency
have made deep reinforcement learning from only real world data
possible on simple robotic tasks [15]4.
5.1.2 New actors access ML capabilities. Another implication of the
access effect is that more actors have access to ML capabilities, since
one needs less data in order to achieve a given level of performance.
This benefits data-poor actors, suggesting that more companies
will be able to deliver a (potentially new) product with a certain
level of performance.
4This is in contrast to methods which are data-efficient with respect to real-world inter-
action, but which rely on large amounts of simulated data [25]. Those methods are less
computationally efficient, and require upfront investment in simulation capabilities.
An interesting type of data-poor actor is a team within a larger
organization, which would like access to more resources (e.g. data,
compute, or engineers) to develop some ML capability. As data
efficiency improves, less data is required to develop a prototype
ML application in order to demonstrate the potential application’s
value. This may smooth out the adoption of ML by organizations
âĂŞ e.g. government agencies âĂŞ who have enough data, but lack
organizational buy-in to develop applications.
5.1.3 Misuse potential. By increasing the number of actors with
access to a given ML capability, the chance increases that an ac-
tor with malicious ends will also gain access. Researchers have
explored the many ways that ML-based applications could be mis-
used, including for cyberattacks, surveillance, and attempts to affect
elections [4].
Deepfakes and synthetic media are a popular example of tech-
nologies with a high potential for misuse. In fact, the risk from
these systems can be understood as a product of their high data
efficiency. Deepfakes that required 1000s of hours of video would
be much less disruptive, whereas a recent system was able to base
deepfakes on as few as 32 video frames [35]. Data efficiency is a
crucial parameter in judging misuse potential.
However, the net effect on misuse from increased data efficiency
is complex. Manymalicious uses can be defended against. Therefore,
as data efficiency increases, we can also expect more actors to gain
access to defensive capacities as well as the development of more
powerful defenses. The net effect will therefore depend e.g. on the
offense-defence balance in the relevant domain [13], the adoption
rates of defensive measures, and the extent to which defender or
attacker capabilities scale faster as data efficiency increases. Take
the example of cybersecurity. Automated vulnerability detection
can be used offensively, but it can also be used defensively in order
to pre-emptively detect and patch vulnerabilities prior to releasing
systems. The factors regarding the net effect of more actors having
access to a technology are generally complex, and vary considerably
based on the domain [31].
5.2 Impacts on Competitive Advantage
Competitive advantage is a core concept in Economics, which refers
to factors which allow firms to outperform competitors, charge
more, offer better services, etc. [28]. The concentration of AI-related
industries and capabilities is an important factor in the governance
landscape of AI – there are different policy options in highly con-
centrated or highly decentralized situations. Further, technological
changes can impact competitive advantage [27].
How would improvements to data efficiency affect the competi-
tive advantage of large AI firms? Prima facie, it seems that improve-
ments in data efficiency would lead to a levelling effect, decreasing
market concentration. Firstly, the access effect gives more actors ac-
cess to any level of performance. Secondly, assuming that there are
performance bounds to a task, such as for example in facial recog-
nition, the performance effect will eventually diminish the absolute
difference in performance between actors. While the above effects
may dominate, the overall effect on competitive advantage may in
fact be to benefit data-rich actors more than data-poor actors. This
is because the value derived from a certain level of performance on
a task âĂŞ say revenue created by a recommendation algorithm âĂŞ
differs greatly between actors and often correlates with the actor’s
size, and because revenue does not scale linearly with performance.
5.2.1 Actors derive different amounts of value from the same level
of ML performance. Actors derive different amounts of value from
the same performance on a task, and so the performance effect
benefits some actors more than others. The value an actor derives
from a certain capability depends on access to complements to the
technology: e.g. having products to sell, customers to sell those
products to, and market access. An ML capability which increases
user engagement by a fixed 5% will increase total engagement,
revenue, and profit more for actors with large user bases.
Furthermore, one can expect being an AI incumbent to corre-
late with having substantial complements to AI technology. Many
contemporary data-rich actors made their investments in ML on
the basis of already having more complements to ML performance
than other actors. For example, digital advertising may be a domain
in which having better ML applications is especially useful, and so
companies with large digital advertising revenue may be more in-
clined to invest in ML. In sum, actors who have more complements
to AI technology benefit more from across-the-board increases in
performance (such as from improvements to data efficiency) and
data rich AI incumbents are likely to have more AI complements,
potentially increasing their competitive advantage.
5.2.2 Winner-take-all markets. Economists often characterize as-
pects of the AI industry as a winner-take-all, or winner-take-most
market. In such a market, what matters most is whether a firm is
first, or not; it doesn’t matter much for their market share how
good their service is in an absolute sense. Since data efficiency does
not alter the rank ordering of actors in the performance of their ML
systems, holding datasets and other assets constant, it will have no
impact on a pure winner-take-all market assuming that all actors
have access to the same algorithms.
5.2.3 Threshold effects. There are many tasks where a certain
threshold of performance is needed before the service has value.
Autonomous vehicles, for example, will only become a viable mass
consumer product once they exceed some performance threshold.
Once this threshold is reached, a company will see a large spike
in the value they can reap from the capability. Improvements in
data efficiency may therefore lead to increased concentration if it
pushes only a small number of actors above the threshold at which
a product becomes viable or a task becomes solvable.
5.2.4 Potential value near performance ceilings. Many real-world
problems have performance ceilings. For instance, a mean squared
error cost function used to measure the performance of an image
recognition algorithm has a fundamental performance ceiling at
0 error. Predicting the outcome of a fair coin has an irreducible
error of 50%. While it may seem that this would mute competi-
tive advantage stemming from the performance effect, it is not so
straightforward. Improved performance can be valuable even close
to a performance boundary, and thus a smaller absolute improve-
ment for a data-rich actor may still yield more value than a larger
absolute performance improvement for a data-poor actor.
Firstly, having a very high performing system allows one to
use its output as the input to other systems. For example, Alipay’s
Smile to Pay allows users to authenticate payments with their face
and access to their mobile phone, showing high confidence in the
accuracy of the underlying facial recognition systems [20].
Secondly, a nominal bound on the performance function does not
necessarily imply a practical bound on performance; further, often
the marginal benefits of improvement increase as we approach a
nominal performance bound. Consider a hypothetical task with the
performance function of P(task is performed correctly) = p. This
performance function is trivially bounded by 0 and 1. One might
think that moving from P(task is performed correctly) = 0.99 to
0.999 is relatively unimportant. However, the expected number of
times that we can perform the task before encountering a single
error is simply the negative binomial distribution NB(p, 1), which
has the following expected value.
Expected number of tasks before error = p1 − p
Going from p = 0.99 to p = 0.999 takes the number of times that
we can do the task before an error from 99 to 999, almost a 10x
improvement. Further, this remains true all the way to the trivial
upper bound of 1 – going from 0.999 to 0.9999 is almost another
10x increase in the expected number of task attempts before error.
In many domains (such as capital investments, survival analysis,
etc.), the time until error is the important parameter, rather than
the probability of failure in any given unit time. This shows that
an apparent bound on the performance function is not necessarily
a bound on the utility function.
5.3 Consequences for Safety and Robustness
5.3.1 Distributional shift. In a much more data-efficient world,
high performance is attainable with access to much less data. This
may mean that deployed systems are more sensitive to distribu-
tional shifts, since they may be trained on less representative data
and because actors will be more tempted to deploy high-performing
systems.
Typically, ML practitioners evaluate their models before deploy-
ment using the data that they have access to. If performance is good
enough, they may choose to deploy the model. Depending on how
the dataset is constructed, larger datasets are more likely to contain
representatives of relatively unlikely inputs. This means that need-
ing a large dataset to get the necessary level of performance could
give some more robustness to distributional shift, if only because it
provides more examples, and a better sense of the rarer parts of the
distribution. As such, increased data efficiency may increase issues
related to distributional shift.
To counteract this effect, developers ought to think carefully
about evaluation and dataset collection âĂŞ if high performance is
possible with a smaller dataset, then it is important to proactively
include less well-represented inputs in the evaluation, since they
will not be sampled as often.
A similar point is that if ML seemingly works on more problems,
then this will increase the extent to which such systems are de-
ployed. If deployment of systems based on smaller training datasets
happens before researchers address issues with generalization, then
this may lead more people to deploy non-robust ML systems.
5.3.2 Human oversight. Human oversight and feedback is a partic-
ularly costly type of data. Some methods for AI safety are based on
the idea of scalable oversight [3], where one either directs human
oversight to be more effective [30], itself a form of data efficiency,
or trains a model of human approval/disapproval and uses that as a
safety component in other parts of the system [22]. In a more data
efficient world, these methods are more viable.
5.4 Impact of Marginal vs. Total Value of Data
Data efficiency, whether modeled as adding data or as increasing
data value, both show a performance effect regarding the total
performance value of data, but they disagree on the marginal per-
formance value of data. The additive model yields a lower marginal
performance value of data, because of the diminishing marginal
returns assumption. The multiplicative model yields a higher mar-
ginal performance value of data because of the chain rule. Thus,
the effect of increased data efficiency on marginal value of data is
an open question according to these models.
5.4.1 Data Markets. Data markets would likely be greatly affected
by changes in data efficiency. Firstly, if the marginal value of data
goes up, this may increase actors’ willingness to buy, sell, or protect
their data. Secondly, the collection of new forms of datamay become
viable if the marginal value of that data surpasses the marginal cost
of collecting it. If the marginal value of data is already greater
than the cost of collection and then increases, this may instead
be realized as increased profit for data-selling firms, rather than
increased data collection.
5.4.2 Data Labeling. If the marginal value of data increases, then
actors will be more willing to pay for data labeling, and there is
more potential for higher wage data-labeling jobs, especially where
the labeling task is more skill or knowledge intensive. For example,
it may become viable to have highly paid professionals such as
doctors or lawyers to label data. As ML becomes viable for more
tasks, the range of labeling tasks may also expand.
5.4.3 Surveillance and Privacy. If the marginal value of data in-
creases this may potentially exacerbate issues in surveillance and
privacy. This can potentially be mitigated by the fact that the
increased marginal value of data makes it more worthwhile to
undergo the expense to collect or process it in a more privacy-
preserving manner.
If data efficiency improves in such a way that the marginal value
of data decreases, one may expect less surveillance on the mar-
gin. However, one might still see a net negative impact on privacy.
Firstly, there are likely high fixed costs of building a data collection
infrastructure, such that a decrease in the marginal value of data
discourages future investments in surveillance, but does not neces-
sarily affect existing data collection infrastructure. Secondly, the
performance effect would mean that systems are higher performing
overall. As such, the data that the actor already has on its users
provides more information about them. An actor would need less
data to e.g. predict whether a user is pregnant. As such each piece
of data could become arguably more privacy infringing. Further,
even if actors are less willing to spend to get new data, as the total
value of data increases, they may be more strongly incentivised to
hold on to data they have, rather than for instance acquiescing to
requests to delete it.
6 FUTUREWORK
6.0.1 Data to performance curves. The questions of how perfor-
mance scales with data using current algorithms, how this has
changed over time, and how it is likely to change in the future
remain fairly unexplored. Researchers with an interest in these
issues can consider conducting empirical tests of the relationships
between data and performance, as well as investigations into how
algorithmic improvements have affected the data to performance
curve.
6.0.2 Performance to utility functions. Amajor complicating factor
in our analysis is the distinction between performance according
to a cost or performance function, and the value provided to a
system’s owner. What is the owner’s utility, for any given level
of performance? Research in this area could help yield a more
granular and detailed view of the dynamics of AI development, but
would require detailed investigation into how exactly ML is used
by various actors.
6.0.3 Production function of AI. The AI production function plays
a crucial role in determining parameters relevant to AI governance
and ethics, but there are many questions remaining about how the
production function of AI works, what to include, how it changes
over time, etc. Research in this area would shed significant light on
questions of the requirements of AI research, and provide a better
understanding of AI progress.
6.0.4 Implications of the AI production function. This paper ana-
lyzed the potential impact of changes to data efficiency.What would
happen if the performance gains of extra computational resources,
the size of model, AI talent, or access to state-of-the-art algorithms
were to change? Authors may also be interested in studying the
extent to which the current structure of the AI industry depends on
the AI production function. For example, many recent state-of-the-
art results have come out of private AI labs rather than universities,
with many researchers moving from university positions into pri-
vate industry [14]. To what extent are these changes a result of e.g.
large AI firms having access to large amounts of computational
resources and data?
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